I.
SUMMARY
Issues
Manager’s Recommendations
Fiscal Impact
II. BACKGROUND
III.
DISCUSSION
1. Actuarial Analysis
2. Potential Pension Solution Scenario
3. Budgetary Impacts
4. Exclusions
IV.
WORKING GROUP APPROACH
1. Benchmarking Against Comparable Municipalities
2. Funding Goal
3. Labor Concessions
4. Planning
Horizon
a. Fulfilling Labor Contracts
b. Economic Benefit of Each Solution
c. Impact of the City’s Current Credit
Situation
d. City Charter Section 77
V
POTENTIAL PENSION SOLUTIONS
1. Revenue Securitization
a. Franchise fee collections
b. Tobacco Settlement Revenues
c. Specified set of lease revenues
2. Employee Pick-Up Savings/Labor Concessions
3. City Property
4. Pension
Obligation Bonds (POBs)
5. Re-Engineering City Services
6. Pension Tax
7. Transfer to CalPERS
VI.
REVENUE ENHANCEMENTS
CONCLUSION
Attachments
Exhibits |
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Options to Increase the Funded Ratio of the
San Diego City Employees’ Retirement
System.
I. SUMMARY
Issues
(1) Should the City Council accept the report on options to increase the
funded ratio of the San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System?
(2) Should the City Council direct the City Manager to develop proposals
to achieve an 80-85% funded ratio by Fiscal Year 2008?
(3) Should the City Council direct the City Manager to proceed with the
evaluation of pension solutions, including but not limited to, the
leveraging of approximately $17 million to securitize City revenues
during Fiscal Year 2006, and provide quarterly status reports to the City
Council on the implementation of pension solutions?
Manager’s Recommendations
top^
(1) Accept the report of the City Manager.
(2) Direct the City Manager to develop proposals to
achieve an 80-85% funded ratio by Fiscal Year 2008.
(3) Direct the City Manager to proceed with the
evaluation of pension solutions, including but not
limited to, the leveraging of approximately $17
million to securitize City revenues during Fiscal Year
2006, and provide quarterly status reports to the City
Council on the implementation of pension solutions.
Fiscal Impact
top^ To be determined based on the pension solutions
implemented. In addition, initial consultant contracts
have been established with Public Financial
Management, Inc. for $10,000 and Towers Perrin for
$22,000. Funds are to be encumbered and paid in
Fiscal Year 2006.
II. BACKGROUND
top^ Annually, an actuarial valuation of the Retirement System’s assets and
liabilities is performed by
the Retirement System’s actuary and a report is presented to the San Diego City
Employees’
Retirement System (SDCERS) Board. The valuation relies on the SDCERS Board’s
approved
actuarial assumptions and is intended to provide a measure of the funding status
of the pension
fund and actuarially computed contribution rates.
As of June 30, 2003, the SDCERS’ annual
actuarial valuation reflected an Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liability (UAAL) of
$1.157 billion
and the plan was determined to be 67.2% funded.1 As of June 30, 2004, the UAAL
increased to
$1.369 billion and the funded ratio decreased to 65.8%.2 The Retirement System’s
actuary
advised in public testimony on April 11, 2005, that the unfunded liability could
in fact be
approximately $1.7 billion, if a different mix of actuarial assumptions were
used such as:
(1)
investment returns are assumed to be 7.75% rather than the 8% used in the 2004
Valuation,
(2)
the Entry Age Normal (EAN)3 rather than the
Projected Unit Credit (PUC)4 cost
method is used,
and
(3) contingent Corbett Settlement payments are included in the valuation.
Much has been said as to the root causes of the unfunded liability in the
pension system. The
final report issued by the Pension Reform Committee (Committee) on September 15,
2004
attributes the causes of the increase in the UAAL and decrease in the funded
ratio from July 1,
1996 to June 30, 2003 to the following factors:
(a) underfunding by the City,
(b) benefit improvements,
(c) net actuarial losses,
(d) use of SDCERS earnings for contingent benefits, and
(e) average investment
performance below expectations.
For further background information and opinions on the Retirement System’s unfunded liability,
please refer to the Voluntary Report of Information dated January 27, 2004, the
Audit of
Actuarial Work Report issued by Mercer Human Resource Consulting (Mercer) on May
11,
2004, the Vinson and Elkins Report issued on September 16, 2004 or the City
Attorney’s Interim
Reports One through Six.
III. DISCUSSION
top^
Because of the concerns about the funding status of the Retirement System, the
City has
implemented and accomplished actions to enhance the funding ratio of the
Retirement System.
Below is a summary of these accomplishments:
• Commencing in July 1996, the City was making annual contributions to the
Retirement
System that were below the actuarially required rates. The City entered into the
“Gleason Settlement” in July 2004. The settlement provided that the City
contributed a
fixed amount of $130 million for Citywide contributions in Fiscal Year 2005,
which was
less than the full actuarial amount but $45 million more than the Fiscal Year
2004
contribution amount. Beginning with the June 30, 2004 Annual Actuarial
Valuation, the UAAL amortization period was reset to a new 30-year fixed amortization period;
for
Fiscal Years 2006, 2007 and 2008, the City’s contribution will be based on the
actuarially
determined funding level with the new 30-year fixed amortization period
commencing
with Fiscal Year 2005.
• Proposition G, a Charter amendment approved by the San Diego voters on
November 2,
2004, required that the amortization period for the UAAL be shortened to no
longer than
15 years beginning with Fiscal Year 2009. Shortening the amortization period
will
increase the annual cost to amortize the UAAL and enhance the funded ratio
• Proposition H, approved by the voters on November 2, 2004, changed the
composition of
the SDCERS’ Board to include seven citizens without personal interest in the
Retirement
System. The remaining seats are filled as follows: two elected by general
members, one
elected by fire safety members, one elected by police safety members, one
elected by
retiree members, and one appointed by the City Manager or designee.
• Public Disclosure Ordinance, approved by the Mayor and City Council on October
11,
2004, will help improve the accuracy of all information disclosed.
• Beginning in Fiscal Year 2005, the City paid $14.9 million for the total
Citywide
payment for retiree health. Of that amount, $7.9 million was paid from the
health care
trust taken from the Retirement System and the balance of $7.0 million was paid
from
City funds. The Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Budget provides $16.5 million for
retiree
health care benefits, which will be paid by the City and no Retirement System
funds will
be used.
• Included in the Fiscal Year 2005 and Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Budget was a net
reduction of 172.89 and 238.37 budgeted positions Citywide respectively. By
downsizing the organization, the liabilities in the Retirement System and the
City’s full
actuarial contributions have decreased.
• Commencing in Fiscal Year 2005,
unclassified employees paid more to the
Retirement
System, thereby relieving the City of that obligation and saving the City
approximately
$1.4 million in Fiscal Year 2005.
• Major economic changes to the labor agreements between the City and each of
the labor
organizations occurred during the most recent labor negotiations. The negotiated
wage
freezes for Fiscal Years 2006 and 2007 are projected to have an approximately
$151
million positive impact on the pension liability. Also, the use of the City
“pick-up” of the employee pension toward the unfunded liability will help
enhance the funding ratio of
the Retirement System.
All the actions performed by the City have created a positive impact on the
funded ratio;
however to continue enhancing the funding ratio of the Retirement System the
City Manager has
formed a pension solutions working group to study and assist in developing
a
menu of pension
solution proposals.
The group is comprised of representatives from the Financial
Management,
City Treasurer, City Auditor and Comptroller, Risk Management, Real Estate
Assets, and
Human Resources departments. Although the working group also included a
representative from
the City Attorney’s Office, representation was withdrawn after the working group
briefed the
City Attorney on July 29, 2005 using an earlier draft of this report.
Subsequently, the City
Attorney released his Plan to Resolve the City’s Legal, Accounting and Financial
Crisis on
August 16, 2005.
In addition, the City of San Diego has retained Public
Financial Management,
Inc., an independent financial advisory firm that has extensive expertise in
advising municipal
entities in the development of recovery plans and assisting localities in the
identification of fiscal
solutions, including providing independent financial advice on Pension
Obligation Bonds
(POBs) transactions. The City has also retained an independent actuary from
Towers Perrin to
provide consultation services to the group.
Note that this report only addresses proposed solutions for the Retirement
System, and does not
include proposed solutions for Retiree Health Care, a liability that has been
estimated at between
$450-675 million by Gabriel, Roeder, Smith & Company (GRS), and could be greater
based
upon variable assumptions. This issue will be addressed separately. In addition,
the report does
not address the issue of rolling back certain pension benefits. That matter
must
be settled in a
court of law and therefore is not under the purview of this report for use as a
potential pension
solution.
1. Actuarial Analysis
top^
Staff requested the actuarial firm, Towers Perrin, to provide
actuarial
projections for this report.
Towers Perrin started with a baseline projection of funded status and
contributions for SDCERS.
Those projections were completed by GRS, SDCERS actuary, and were based on the
actuarial
valuation as of June 30, 2003. In order to provide projections based on updated
information,
Towers Perrin implemented modifications to the June 30, 2003 valuation and made
additional
assumptions as described below:
• Updated the projections based on the published June 30, 2004 actuarial
valuation results
and successfully replicated the June 30, 2004 actuarial valuation prepared by GRS
• Recognized in the projected actuarial valuation for the following five years,
the $218
million deferred investment gain that existed as of June 30, 2004
• Recognized an expected actuarial loss
estimated by GRS of $40 million as of
June 30,
2005 for service purchase
• Included the actuarial liability estimated by GRS of $63 million for
contingent Corbett
benefits for the June 30, 2005 actuarial valuation
• Recognized actuarial gains estimated by GRS to total
$151 million,
attributable to the
Fiscal Year 2006 and 2007 salary freezes in the actuarial valuation projections
as of June
30, 2006 and June 30, 2007
• Used estimated Citywide payroll for Fiscal Years 2006-2008 provided by City
staff
• Assumed a 4.25% annual payroll growth for Fiscal Years 2009-2014
• Used a 30-year declining amortization for Fiscal Years 2005 through 2008 as
established
by Gleason Settlement
• Used a 15-year declining amortization for Fiscal Years 2009-2014 for
Declining
Scenario. A "declining" (fixed) amortization means that the actuarially required
contribution in a particular year would be the UAAL amortized over the remaining
years
in the fixed period, for example from 15 to 14 to 13, decreasing to zero. When
actual
experience matches actuarial assumptions, a declining amortization period will
result in
a decreasing UAAL.
• Used a 15-year rolling amortization for Fiscal Years 2009-2014 for
Rolling
Scenario.
A "rolling" (non-declining) amortization period means that each year, the UAAL
is reamortized
over a set number of years to determine the amount of the annual employer
contribution that is due toward the UAAL portion of the contribution. When a
rolling
15-year amortization period is used, the payment is larger than the interest
cost and the
unfunded liability decreases if there are no net actuarial losses. However, the
unfunded
liability is never completely paid off because the 15-year period is
reestablished every
year.
Note that Mercer audited the June 30, 2003 actuarial valuation and concluded
“that the methods
and assumptions used by GRS are reasonable and conform to accepted actuarial
practices.”5
However, Mercer also recommended “alternative methods for SDCERS and its actuary
to
explore in order to better represent the funded status of the system.”
6
In
addition, the City’s Audit Committee advised that it has “substantial questions as to the soundness
of current and
future actuarial valuations” and in fact, the funded ratio may be considerably
lower and the UAAL considerably higher if significant changes in actuarial assumptions are
implemented. The
Audit Committee also recommended that SDCERS’ Board hire a new actuary. The
Board is
currently in the process of hiring a new actuary. As a caveat, if in fact there
are changes to the
current actuarial assumptions, then the projections presented herein will differ
from these
estimates.
As mentioned previously, Towers Perrin provided projections assuming both a
15-year declining
amortization and a 15-year rolling amortization schedule for Fiscal Years
2009-2014. These
projections include changes in the actuarial assumptions introduced by the
recent passage of
Proposition G.
Proposition G, a City Charter amendment approved by San Diego
voters on
November 2, 2004, requires that the amortization period of the UAAL be shortened
to no longer
than 15 years beginning with Fiscal Year 2009, resulting in significant
increases in funding
requirements. Nonetheless, the amendment to the City Charter does not specify
the amortization
method. It is up to SDCERS’ Board to determine which method will be used.
For
these
purposes, both a more conservative application of the proposition, defining the
amortization
period as a fixed 15-year term (with the remaining term declining each year),
and a rolling 15-
year term, which provides a lower contribution towards the UAAL, are shown. The
Base Case Declining Scenario projection assumes there are no additional
contributions above and beyond the actuarially required employer contributions
that cover the normal cost and amortization cost of the UAAL.
The Base Case
Declining Scenario projection:
(Table 1)
The projections reflect that the funded ratio gradually improves from
approximately 66% as of
6/30/2004 to approximately 73% over the projection period (Fiscal Year
2014) as
the estimated
City contributions grow from about 27% of payroll for Fiscal Year 2006 to over
52% of payroll
for Fiscal Year 2014. Moreover, the projections reflect that the City
Contributions as a
percentage of the City net total operating budget are estimated to grow from
about 8% for Fiscal
Year 2006 to approximately 16% for Fiscal Year 2014, with the assumption that
the net total
operating budget for the City grows 3% annually after Fiscal Year 2006.
The Base Case Rolling Scenario projection assumes there are no additional
contributions above and beyond the actuarially required employer contributions
that cover the normal cost and amortization cost of the UAAL.
Base Case Rolling Scenario
projection:
(Table 2)
The projections reflect that the funded ratio gradually improves from
approximately 66% as of
6/30/2004 to approximately 70% over the projection period (Fiscal Year
2014) as
the estimated
City contributions grow from about 27% of payroll for Fiscal Year 2006 to over
42% of payroll
for Fiscal Year 2014. Moreover, the projections reflect that the City
Contributions as a
percentage of the City net total operating budget are estimated to grow from
about 8% for Fiscal
Year 2006 to approximately 13% for Fiscal Year 2014, with the assumption that
the net total
operating budget for the City grows 3% annually after Fiscal Year 2006.
2. Potential Pension Solution Scenario
top^
The focus of this report is to identify viable options to increase the funded
ratio of the
Retirement System to help restore fiscal stability to the system. Accordingly,
this report
discusses the use of:
(a) labor concessions,
(b) POBs issuance,
(c) sale of under-utilized
City lands,
(d) securitizing lease income or other City revenues, and
(e) additional solutions.
Thus, this report
presents a list of potential solutions for the City Council to consider and
provide further direction
to the City Manager to amend and/or implement select solutions or identify new
options for
consideration.
By combining different pension solution sources as presented below, projections
reflect that by
Fiscal Year 2008, the pension funded ratio can be significantly increased.
(Tables 3)
The Pension Solution Scenarios (Declining and Rolling) below show the actuarial
results with a
total of $600 million additional contributions as specified in the above table.
These additional
contributions are over and above the actuarially required contributions that
cover both the
normal cost and amortization cost of the UAAL. Note also that the timing of the
additional
contributions in each fiscal year plays a major role on the amortization of the
resulting UAAL.
In other words, the sooner the additional contributions are infused into the
Retirement System,
the greater the positive impact on the funded ratio. If in fact there are any
changes to the
contributions or the assumed timing, the projected results would differ from
these estimates.
The Pension Solution Declining Scenario is shown below:
(Tables 4)
The actuarial projections recognize the higher assets resulting from these
additional
contributions, which are in addition to the anticipated regularly scheduled
contributions based on
the normal cost and amortization of the UAAL. The estimated funded ratio
improves from
approximately 66% currently to approximately 82% as of 6/30/2008 due to these
additional
contributions and then declines gradually to approximately 78% as of 6/30/2014.
Under the
Pension Solution Declining Scenario, City annual contributions toward normal
cost and amortization cost are estimated to grow from approximately 27% of
payroll for Fiscal Year 2006
to approximately 42% of payroll by Fiscal Year 2014 (compared to over
52% in the
Base Case
Declining Scenario). Moreover, the projections reflect that the City
Contributions as a
percentage of the City net total operating budget are estimated to grow from
about 8% for Fiscal
Year 2006 to approximately 13% for Fiscal Year 2014, with the assumption that
the net total
operating budget for the City grows 3% annually after Fiscal Year 2006.
Alternatively, the Pension Solution Rolling Scenario is shown below:
(Table 5)
The actuarial projections recognize the higher assets resulting from these
additional
contributions, which are in addition to the anticipated regularly scheduled
contributions based on
the normal cost and amortization of the UAAL. The estimated funded ratio
improves from
approximately 66% currently to approximately 82% as of 6/30/2008 due to these
additional
contributions and then declines gradually to approximately 77% as of 6/30/2014.
Under the
Pension Solution Rolling Scenario, City annual contributions toward normal cost
and
amortization cost are projected to grow from approximately 27% of payroll for
Fiscal Year 2006
to approximately 35% of payroll by Fiscal Year 2014 (compared to over
42% in the
Base Case
Rolling Scenario). Moreover, the projections reflect that the City Contributions
as a percentage
of the City net total operating budget are projected to grow from about 8% for
Fiscal Year 2006
to approximately 10% for Fiscal Year 2014, with the assumption that the net
total operating
budget for the City grows 3% annually after Fiscal Year 2006.
Note that a different set of actuarial assumptions and methods would generate
different
results. And, if plan design changes are adopted, or if the covered population,
rates of
investment return, salary changes, or other demographic experience are different
than
projected, the projected results would also differ from these estimates.
After additional cash infusions in Fiscal Years 2006-2008, the funded ratio may
decrease slightly
each year, as described in both the Declining and Rolling Pension Solution
Scenarios.
This
projected decline is due to the delay in making the annual actuarially required
contribution based
on a prior year valuation with lower contribution requirements (For example, the
Fiscal Year
2006 actuarial contribution is determined based on Fiscal Year 2004 actuarial
valuation results).
Another potential contributing factor for the decline in funded ratio after
Fiscal Year 2008 is
that the Actuarial Accrued Liability projected by GRS (which was relied on by
Towers Perrin)
may include some assumed continued actuarial losses in future years. In order to
continue maintaining a funded ratio at approximately 80% level or to enhance it
further, additional
pension solutions, over and above the City’s annual actuarial contributions,
are
required.
3. Budgetary Impacts
top^
Citywide budgetary impact analyses (Declining and Rolling), depicted below, show
that the total
City budget is anticipated to need an additional $8.6 million in Fiscal Year
2007 and
approximately $15 million in Fiscal Year 2008 to implement the Pension Solution
Scenario as
compared to the Base Case Scenario.
The Citywide budgetary declining impact analysis is shown below:
(Table 6)
Alternatively, the Citywide budgetary rolling impact analysis is shown below:
(Table 7)
Budgetary benefits from contributing additional funds and the higher funded
ratio are not
anticipated to be achieved until Fiscal Year 2008 and later, primarily because
higher assets
within the Retirement System are only recognized in that year’s valuation which
is published the
following year, and actuarial rates are then paid by the City one additional
year later. In other
words, benefits achieved through a cash infusion in year one are not fully
realized until year
three.
Although savings will not be realized in the City’s budget during the
first two years, the proposed Pension Solution Scenario will still enhance the pension funded ratio
of the Retirement
System. A potential mitigating factor, however, is the expiration of the ERAF
III agreement with
the State, which should result in a State return of approximately $16.9 million
in Property Tax
revenue in Fiscal Year 2007 and thereafter which can be used to address
additional pension
related expenditures in those years. The benefit of implementing the Pension
Solution Declining
Scenario will provide a savings of $17-50 million annually from Fiscal Years
2009-2014 or a
savings of $17-31 million annually by implementing the Pension Solution Rolling
Scenario, thus further allowing the City to use these resources to further
enhance the system or meet other
policy objectives.
4. Exclusions
top^
As mentioned above, this report excludes consideration of the following:
a. Elimination of Certain Benefits.
The City Attorney has indicated that negotiated improvements in City employee
pension
benefits since 1996 are unlawful and must be rolled back. Due to the complexity
of the
issue; the fact that the City cannot predict the timing or outcome of any such
legal action;
and because benefits may be considered to be vested to each member and, if
vested,
benefits cannot be renegotiated, this is not assumed as an immediate solution to
help
resolve the funding of the Retirement System. If the pension benefits are found
unlawful
by a court of law, the elimination of these benefits could have a positive
impact on the
funded ratio of the Retirement System.
b. Retiree Health Care Solutions
This report only focuses on pension solutions. Retiree health care solutions
will be
addressed separately. The issue of retiree health care solutions includes the
unfunded
liability, is estimated at $447-672 million by Gabriel, Roeder, Smith & Company,
but
could be higher depending on variable assumptions. In addition, other items to
be
addressed include:
(1) the effect of the health-eligible retiree definition,
which states that
employees must have 10 years of service with the City of San Diego to receive
100% of
the retiree health benefit and five years of service to receive 50% of the
retiree health
benefit,
(2) the establishment of a defined contribution plan for retiree
medical benefits
for employees hired on or after July 1, 2005, and
(3) the review of existing
retiree health
benefits to explore the consolidation of health care options to help manage the
cost of
health care for employees hired before July 1, 2005 and current retirees.
It is
important
to emphasize that for Fiscal Year 2005 the total Citywide payment for retiree
health was
$14.9 million. Of that amount, $7.9 million was paid from the health care trust
taken
from the system assets and the balance of $7.0 million was paid from City funds.
The
Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Budget provides $16.5 million for retiree health care
benefits,
which will be paid by the City and no Retirement System funds will be used.
IV.
WORKING GROUP APPROACH
top^
In developing the proposed Pension Solution Scenario described above, the
working group first
spent time reviewing the City’s current position, consulting on potential
pension solutions, and
developing a reasonable funding target to propose to the City Council. This
section provides the
background on the research discussion and analysis performed and reviewed by the
group.
1. Benchmarking Against Comparable Municipalities
top^
In order to quantify an appropriate level of pension funding and to compare the
City against
other comparable municipalities, a benchmark between the City of San Diego and
other local and
state government agencies was prepared. The following table compares the funded
ratio of
various California municipalities.
(Table 8)
As shown, comparable municipalities, subject to many of the same legal
requirements and
economic impacts, have a notably higher funded ratio for their respective
retirement systems.
The Public Fund Survey (Attachment A), published in September 2004, indicates
the importance
of a well-funded pension plan. This survey, sponsored by the National
Association of State
Retirement Administrators and the National Council on Teacher Retirement, covers
101 public
retirement systems and 125 plans. The survey represents 85% of the nation’s
entire public
retirement system with 12.7 million active members and $1.86 trillion in assets.
According to its
results, a majority of the public pension plans surveyed have a funded ratio
between 80% and
100%. In addition, there are plans funded at greater than 100%, and the survey
found that 74%
of the plans in the Public Fund Survey have a funded ratio of 80% or greater.
The average
funded level for Fiscal Year 2003 for 117 plans (excluding those plans in which
liabilities
always equal assets) that were evaluated is 88.2%, with the median at 91.5%.
These findings are consistent with those of a similar study by Wilshire
Associates published in
October 2004 (Attachment B). This study surveyed 104 city and county retirement
systems
across the country representing over $309 billion in assets. Of the 63 systems
reviewed that
reported actuarial values on or after June 30, 2003, the average funded ratio
was 83% and those
that were underfunded (less than 100% funding ratio) maintained an average
funded ratio of
79%. In addition, only 13 of the 63 systems had funded ratios lower than 80% and
six systems
had a funded ratio below 70%.
Based on comparative data from the Public Fund
Survey, the Wilshire study, and other local and
state agencies, it is clear that San Diego’s funded ratio falls well below the
average for other
public retirement systems. To bring its system in line with these experiences,
the City must
make a significant effort to enhance the retirement system’s funding level.
2. Funding Goal
top^
The objective is to propose solutions that will enhance the funded ratio of the
Retirement System
and implement a mix of solutions at the direction of the City Council. It is
important for the City
to consider adopting a pension funding goal. Based on comparative data discussed
above, the
suggested short-term goal is to achieve an 80% to 85% funded ratio by Fiscal
Year 2008. This is
consistent with Councilmembers Peters’, Atkins’, and Madaffer’s goal of
achieving an 80%
funded ratio within two years as stated in their June 13, 2005 memorandum on
“Additional Steps
to Reduce Pension Deficit” (Attachment C).
Reaching this funding target would not only bring the City in line with
comparable systems and stability to the Retirement System in the short term, but
would also achieve a funded ratio that is considered by the credit rating
agencies to be “adequately funded from a credit perspective.” Pension plans with
a ratio below 70%-80% may have “a potentially significant impact” on the
municipality, according to Fitch Ratings, “particularly in cases where the
annually required contribution is a significant and growing part of the
sponsor’s budget,” as is the case with the City of San Diego.7
Moody’s Investors Service has noted that it “expects
municipal entities with large unfunded obligations to have, or develop,
a plan to reduce them.”8
This funding target, and the plans adopted to achieve it, will lay a strong
foundation for renewed
fiscal strength for the City of San Diego.
3. Labor Concessions
top^
Major economic changes to the labor
agreements between the City and each of the
labor
organizations occurred during the most recent labor negotiations. Agreements
with labor unions
resulted in the reduction of City “pick-up” of the employee pension contribution
by 3% for the
Municipal Employees’ Association (MEA), the International Association of Fire
Fighters Local
145, and the Deputy City Attorney Association (DCAA) and a unilaterally imposed
reduction of
3.2% for the San Diego Police Officers Association (POA).
In addition, AFSCME Local 127
negotiated a 1.9% salary reduction in lieu of additional employee pension
contribution and a
benefit freeze.
The agreements with the bargaining units explicitly indicate
that savings to the
City must be used to address the UAAL within the timeframe of the respective
contracts.
The
labor contract with Local 127 specifically states that "By June 30, 2008, if the
City has not
dedicated a total of $600 million or more to the UAAL reduction, including the
amount achieved
by leveraging employee salary reduction and pension contribution monies, the AFSCME salary
reduction monies with interest will revert to CERS Employee Contribution Rate
Reserve for
benefit of Local 127 unit members to defray employee pension contributions. The
City will be
excused from meeting the above obligation if the funded ratio reaches 100% by
June 30, 2008."
Also, since the labor agreements with Local 145 and DCAA are
one-year terms, it is critical to
leverage all the employee pension contributions or salary reductions in Fiscal
Year 2006.
The
projected amount from labor concessions that is committed to address the
pension’s unfunded
liability is approximately $17.3 million (General Fund and Non-General Fund) in
Fiscal Year
2006.
Also as part of the agreements with the labor unions, several benefits were
eliminated for
employees hired on or after July 1, 2005 for all bargaining units. These changes
include the
elimination of the following benefits:
(a) the Deferred Retirement Option Plan
(DROP),
(b) the 13th
Check,
(c) the option to purchase years of service credits (“air-time”), and
(d) the
elimination of all
formulae except 2.5% at 55 for General Members and 3.0% at 50 for Safety
Members.
Also for
employees hired on or after July 1, 2005, it was agreed to establish a trust
vehicle for a defined
contribution plan to fund and determine retiree medical benefits. The
employer/employee
contributions for such a plan were not discussed during the labor negotiations
and a joint study
between the City and each labor union to be completed in Fiscal Year 2006; will
determine the
contribution amounts.
The City is also exploring the consolidation of health
care options to help
manage the cost of health care for both current and retired employees and, as
part of the
agreements with the labor unions, the new definition of “health-eligible
retiree” states that
employees must have 10 years of service with the City of San Diego to receive
100% of the
retiree health benefit and five years of service to receive 50% of the retiree
health benefit.
The economic benefits from the labor agreements have created an incentive for
the City to begin
addressing the unfunded liability issue of the Retirement System.
4. Planning
Horizon
top^
Restoring the funding level of the City’s Retirement System is a priority for
the City. Since the
labor contracts encourage the City to move as soon as possible on resolving the
pension deficit,
the short-term goal should be to fulfill the requirements discussed above for
leveraging their
retirement offset contributions and salary reduction for pension solutions.
It
is the responsibility
of the City to honor the contractual agreement it has made with the employees by
pursuing
solutions that will have a positive and significant impact on the pension’s
funded ratio.
Within
Fiscal Year 2006, City staff will propose to the City Council one or more
pension funding
approaches that can be implemented expeditiously to fulfill labor bargaining
units’ requirements
to leverage their contributions.
5. Summary of Considerations for Selection and Evaluation of Solutions
While identifying solutions to increase the pension funded ratio, the following
criteria were
considered:
a. Fulfilling Labor Contracts
top^
The labor union agreements contain economic concessions and
sacrifices from the
employees and ensure that savings from net offset or salary reduction will be
applied to
the Retirement System in Fiscal Year 2006 and not made available for the City’s
operations. It is critical that any pension solutions implemented fulfill the
intent of the
labor contracts in order to maximize available resources and honor the
commitment of
City employees. Labor contract specifications such as the requirement to
leverage
employee pension contributions or salary reductions were considered in
evaluation of
each potential pension solution.
b. Economic Benefit of Each Solution
top^
The aim is to maximize the effect of the resources applied to addressing the
pension
deficit. When analyzing each potential solution, an assessment needs to occur on
the
relative benefit of the approach versus other alternatives, as well as, in the
case of the
leveraged approaches, the cost of borrowing to fund the Retirement System versus
annual
cost of amortizing the UAAL. The intent is to achieve the greatest possible
increase of
the funded ratio of the Retirement System while maintaining fiscal obligations
within
City funds and providing City services.
c. Impact of the City’s Current Credit
Situation
top^
Currently, the City is not able to access the
public financing markets,
primarily due to the
lack of audited financial statements for recent fiscal years. The completion of
the audits
is critical in regaining the confidence of the financial markets. The
implementation of
some of the pension solution proposals relies on the City’s ability to access
those
markets. Since raising capital to deposit in the Retirement System is likely to
be more
efficient and less costly when it can be achieved via the public markets,
maximum
flexibility to refinance or restructure any interim borrowings after release of
the financial
audits should be retained. This may mean leveraging available revenues over a
short-term
horizon, for instance, and/or maintaining the ability to pre-pay and restructure
the
borrowing.
d. City Charter Section 77
top^
Section 77 requires that all money received from the sale of City-owned real
property
shall be placed in the Capital Outlay Fund. The funds, as required under City
Charter
Section 77, “shall be used exclusively for the acquisition, construction, and
completion of
permanent public improvements, real property, water and sewer mains and
extensions
and shall not be used for other purposes except with the consent of two-thirds
of the
electors of the City of San Diego voting at a general or special election.”
Thus, real
property sale proceeds may only be available to the extent they supplant General
Fund
contributions to the Capital Outlay Fund or for possible redemption of
outstanding
General Fund debt issued for capital outlays.
This proposal could therefore
result in
savings to the General Fund by releasing existing appropriations for capital
outlay, or in
the form of relief on debt service that could be used for funding the Retirement
System.
In considering the options of using the proceeds from the sale of City lands to
increase
the funded ratio, the City Charter limitations on uses need to be taken into
account.
V. POTENTIAL PENSION SOLUTIONS
top^
Below is a description of potential pension contribution sources that the City
Council could
consider. As shown above in the Pension Solution Scenario, a combination of
these options
should be pursued to enhance the funded ratio of the Retirement System. The
options include:
1. Revenue Securitization
top^
Significant one-time cash infusions may be able to be generated through the
leveraging of
ongoing General Fund lease revenues or other stable revenue streams.
The City
may be able to
leverage specific future General Fund revenue streams (“receivables”) in several
ways, most
notably through the issuance of revenue bonds or the securitization of those
certain receivables.
As a pension funding solution, though current circumstances preclude the City
from participating
in the traditional public offering forum, securitization of certain General Fund
revenue streams
over a defined period is believed to be a viable option.
See Attachment D for a detail discussion on the securitization structure. Note
that the amount of
up-front proceeds that can be generated from a securitization option is
dependent upon the size
and type of revenue stream that is pledged, duration of the pledge, and the
interest rate at which
the revenue stream is discounted. Also, certain revenue coverage requirements
need to be met
for all securitization scenarios discussed below. However, revenues from the
securitized revenue
stream in excess of the annual debt service requirement associated with the
securitization will
flow back to the City.
Based on a summary review of some of the major revenue
categories within the General Fund
and upon preliminary assessment of the market interest to underwrite this debt
category, the
following securitization options were identified:
a. Franchise fee collections, primarily from Cox Communications and Time Warner
Cable television franchises, equal approximately
$14.9 million (Fiscal Year 06
budgeted estimate) per year over a 5 -10 year period. It is estimated that this
revenue stream, including required coverage, could generate approximately $38-
48 million in upfront proceeds when securitized over 5 years and approximately
$66-84 million over 10 years. Based on current market conditions, the estimated
discount rate may range between 4.60%- 5.75% for these options. In order to
meet the previously stated goal of $100 million through securitization,
additional
years of pledge could increase the up-front proceeds. If securitized for 14-19
years, estimated upfront proceeds under this scenario could generate $99-106
million; the borrowing rate would be higher than the 10 year estimate under this
scenario due to the extended duration. Note that the pledge of franchise fees
beyond Fiscal Year 2019 would require an extension to the current franchise
agreement.
b. Tobacco Settlement Revenues. A portion of or the entire future
tobacco
settlement revenues (Fiscal Year 06 budgeted estimate is $10.3 million), securitized over a
15-20 year period. If the total anticipated tobacco revenue
is
pledged, this revenue stream is estimated to generate approximately $53-77
million in upfront proceeds when securitized over 15 years and $61-92 million
over 20 years. Based on current market conditions, the estimated borrowing rate
may range between 5.54%- 6.75% depending on the financing term identified.
top^
c. Specified set of lease revenues from
long-term ground leases9 equaling
approximately $23.8 million in lease income securitized for a duration of
5-10
years. It is estimated that this revenue stream ($17.3 million, an amount
equivalent to the employee offset saving for debt service, plus $6.5 million for
required revenue coverage) could generate approximately $51-65 million in
upfront proceeds when securitized over 5 years and approximately $88-112
million over 10 years. Based on current market conditions, the estimated
discount
rate may range between 5.25%- 6.25% for the financing terms discussed above.
In order to achieve the previously stated goal of $100 million through securitization process, it is estimated that the duration of the lease revenue
pledge
needs to be between 9 and 13 years depending on the borrowing rates.
top^
Note that the estimated revenue streams from the
Franchise Fee scenario
(option a) and the
Tobacco Settlement Revenues (option b), $14.9 million and $10.3 million
respectively, on a
stand alone basis, will not generate a debt service expenditure equal to the
employee offset
savings equaling $17.3 million. In order to fully leverage the employee offset
savings, a
combination of options will be necessary in order to fully leverage the annual
savings.
2. Employee Pick-Up Savings/Labor Concessions
top^
A three year labor agreement was reached with MEA and Local 127, a one year
labor contract
for Local 145, and DCAA and the City unilaterally imposed terms on POA for
Fiscal Year 2006.
Simply put, the terms of these new labor agreements will provide the City with a
revenue stream
of approximately $17.3 million in Fiscal Year 2006, which has been committed to
improve the
Retirement System’s funded ratio. This money comes from the savings the City
realizes by employees contributing a greater percentage to the pension plan
beginning July 1, 2005, or a
salary reduction in the case of Local 127.
As mentioned in each respective
Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), “All City savings….shall be designated exclusively for
payment to
support a leveraged mechanism to reduce SDCERS UAAL, such as POBs, lease
capitalization or
a similar mechanism selected by the City.”
City staff is currently evaluating
the highest and best
use of this money, including the use of these funds to reimburse the General
Fund for the securitization of other General Fund revenue streams.
These contracts also resulted in a
negotiated wage and benefit freeze for MEA,
Local 145, Local
127, and DCAA, and unilaterally imposed on POA. The negotiated and imposed wage
and
benefit freezes are projected to have an approximately $151 million positive
impact on the
pension liability within the next two years, comprising an estimated $75 million
reduction of
actuarial liability in Fiscal Year 2006 and an estimated $76 million reduction
in Fiscal Year
2007, according to the Retirement System’s actuary.
3. City Property
top^
City staff has developed a list of City property for consideration at a future
closed session
meeting of the City Council. The identified properties proposed for sale are
held for investment
purposes rather than for the City’s core mission and have a preliminary estimate
of value
potentially in excess of $250 million. Staff believes that it is reasonable to
assume that $100
million in land sales could be consummated over a 3 year period to achieve the
goals stated in
this report.
The properties would not be part of the City’s core assets or public amenities
such as open space
land, or dedicated park land, but investment property that could be sold and
developed to further
a number of important policy objectives such as affordable housing, recreational
opportunities,
and economic development objectives including job creation and business
recruitment and
retention.
Sound asset management strategies include constantly assessing an
existing portfolio
to determine what properties should be considered for potential disposition and
identifying
opportunities for acquisition to ensure the portfolio's key objectives are being
addressed.
The City also owns hundreds of income producing leaseholds which
generate in excess of $40
million annually. A very limited number of these properties may be candidates
for disposition as
they are encumbered by leases approved decades ago whose terms have not kept
pace with
appreciation. In terms of timing, this may prove the most expedient option, as
the most logical
buyer, who will pay the highest price, is the existing lessee. However, in the
medium to longer
term, the best prospects are the investment properties. It would take some time
to obtain the land
use entitlements which would provide the basis for obtaining the highest value.
Most of these
properties currently pose a maintenance liability, and putting them back into
productive use
would implement some of the policy objectives listed above.
Additionally, the City may wish to consider retaining investment properties, but
leasing them for
valuable development opportunities. While there may be numerous development
opportunities
on investment and under-utilized City owned properties, most will take a
significant amount of
time and resources before an economic return could be realized. Each site has
unique attributes
and restrictions and must be carefully researched. Significant staff time and
resources would be devoted to ensure the development potential prior to
soliciting interest for development partners.
As part of a sound asset management strategy, certain parcels would be best
suited for ground
leases and/or joint ventures, while others may be best suited for sale. Land
sales, as described
above, provide one-time, short term revenue. Leases or joint ventures provide an
ongoing longterm
revenue stream and retain City assets. As such,
development opportunities on
investment
land can best address the longer term objectives. Staff will provide updates and
analyses on
lease development opportunities during future reports.
Consideration has also been given to transferring City land directly to the
Retirement System.
However, the administration of the system has indicated that this would not be
desirable.
Transferring land assets would significantly modify the system’s investments
portfolio, and may
require the system to begin managing land, property and leases.
4. Pension
Obligation Bonds (POBs)
top^
By means of a private placement or a public offering, a
$200-600 million
multi-phase issuance
of POBs as one of the strategies for addressing the outstanding UAAL is
currently being studied.
To the extent a portion of the outstanding UAAL is funded with POBs, the debt
service on
POBs would closely approximate the portion of the City’s employer contribution
attributable to
the amortization of that portion of the UAAL. In addition to improving the
funded ratio of the
pension system through the deposit of POB proceeds, the City would also benefit
from the
issuance of POBs if the projected annual debt service on the POBs were less than
the annual
payment required to amortize the UAAL, thus potentially generating cash flow
savings. Under
present market conditions, POBs are expected to reduce the present value cost of
funding the
system due to the fact that the interest rates on these bonds are currently
lower than the actuarial
cost of amortizing the UAAL.
Many municipal pension funds, including SDCERS, assume a long-term rate of
return of 8% on
their investments, and the current interest rate on POBs is less than 8.0%. By
using POBs, there
is a potential for lowering the interest costs incurred in paying off the UAAL.
For the purpose of
comparing estimated projected costs of borrowing under current market
conditions, a traditional
public sale of 30-year insured POBs is expected to have a cost of borrowing of
approximately
5.80%. The interest cost on a public offering of 30-year uninsured POBs is
currently estimated at
approximately 6.15%.
While the City cannot proceed with a public offering of POBs in advance of the release of the
Fiscal Year 2003 and Fiscal Year 2004 financial statements, preliminary
discussions with
underwriters active in the POB market indicate that the City could issue POBs on
a private
placement basis in the meantime. As with publicly sold POBs, completion of a
successful
validation action would be a prerequisite to the sale of POBs through a private
placement.
Also,
similar to the recent private placements of the City’s tax anticipation notes
for Fiscal Year 2005
and Fiscal Year 2006, some limited disclosure regarding the City’s financial
condition (such as unaudited financial results) would need to be provided to the underwriter and
potential investors
for a privately placed POB. Depending upon the structure and maturity of such
privately placed
POBs, the interest rate on such a financing may be higher or lower than the
expected rates noted
above for a 30-year public offering. If a private placement were pursued, it
could be structured
to maintain the flexibility to refinance via a public offering of POBs when that
becomes feasible.
Structuring the financing as variable rate bonds, as a
short-term borrowing, or with an early
redemption feature would be some potential mechanisms to provide the City with
future
flexibility.
Most municipalities issue general obligation or General Fund backed POBs,
capitalizing on the
credit of the sponsoring entity of the pension system. The issuance of POBs can
often be viewed
as involving a series of tradeoffs, including: exchanging one type of debt for
another; reducing
the short-run need to allocate an increasing share of discretionary revenues to
provide for UAAL
amortization, while increasing pressures for increased employee benefits if the
system is fully
funded and increasing the probability of a future UAAL. Since these tradeoffs
are expected to
often balance out in the long-term, the rating agencies perceive them to be
neutral in terms of
their net impact on a municipality’s credit. See Attachment D for projected
impacts on the
City’s debt position from issuing additional debt, including POBs.
Essentially, POBs replace a “soft liability” (the unfunded pension liability) with a “hard
liability” (the debt service on the taxable pension bonds). Once POBs are
issued, the bond
proceeds are deposited in the pension fund with the objective that the fund will
earn a higher
return than the interest cost on the bonds.
Critics of the POB instrument
believe that the
government, by issuing a POB, would be "bonding out" costs that would otherwise be
paid out of
current period revenues thereby increasing the total cost to the government.
Proponents note that
an unfunded pension liability represents a general obligation and that the POB
represents a true
commitment to fund the pension.
The ultimate risk is that the pension fund loses
a portion of the
new capital infusion due to lower or negative return on pension fund
investments, while still
having to make its required future debt payments and pay the unfunded pension
liability.
It should be noted that a significant POB issuance will result in a
sudden
increase in the
Retirement System’s assets, increasing exposure during a market downturn with
below average
investment returns, or even negative returns as in the past 2-3 years. An
investment
underperformance over an extended period of time will lead to actuarial losses
and new unfunded liabilities, resulting in the need to increase contribution levels to
bring the pension
systems into balance.
While POBs can be viewed as either a positive or negative
option in the
light of short term market fluctuations, a final assessment of a POB performance
can only be
made following the full amortization of the issuance and as its final maturity
is approached. If
there are net savings after full amortization of the POB obligation, the POB
strategy is
considered successful.
It is also important to note that although
POBs have the
immediate effect of lowering the UAAL,
they should not, as a stand alone strategy, be regarded as providing a long-term
solution to
underlying pension funding requirements.
Unless POBs are part of a more
comprehensive
strategy to address structural funding requirements, either in the form of
increased contributions
to match them with actuarial requirements and/or reduced growth in benefit
costs, they will not
guarantee a positive credit evaluation by credit rating agencies.
The issuance of POBs, via public offering or private placement, may require a
validation
process. The judicial validation process has potential for legal challenges and
delays. However,
a history of successful validations of POBs in California, and the County’s
successful issuance
of multiple series of POBs in the recent past by adopting a similar process,
would seem to indicate that the risk of legal challenges is reduced.
Under the conventional structure for a POB, the municipality issues its POBs and
simultaneously
issues a debenture (essentially a promissory note) to the pension system equal
to the amount of
the bonds, which is equal to all, or a portion of, the UAAL. Upon the sale of
the bonds, the
proceeds of the bonds are deposited with a Trustee, who transfers an amount
equal to the
debenture to the Retirement System to retire all, or a portion of, the UAAL. In
effect, the UAAL, which is an internal statutory obligation of the municipality, is
replaced
by an external
debt. In California, since 1993, local governments have issued over $10 billion
in POBs,
including various refundings. The issuers have included 20 counties including
Los Angeles, San
Diego, and Sacramento, and over 12 cities including Oakland, Fresno, and Long
Beach.
See Attachment D for additional detail on the POB option. Also included in
Attachment D is the
debt affordability analysis that outlines credit impacts from additional debt
issuance backed by
the City General Fund.
5. Re-Engineering City Services
top^
In developing the Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Budget, the City Manager proposed a
budget that
prioritized structural balance.
Reductions, both in services and personnel, were
identified to
bring General Fund expenditures in line with General Fund revenues. The net
reduction of budgeted positions Citywide included in the final Fiscal Year 2006 Annual Budget
was 238.37,
which reflects the restoration of approximately 42 positions.
The City Council
voted to use
approximately $7 million for various restorals that were funded primarily with
one-time
revenues. Moody’s Investor Services wrote that this action “did not appear to be
prioritizing
structural balance” particularly when “the budget for Fiscal Year 2006 includes
significant
expenditure reductions in part to offset a previously agreed increase in the
City’s pension
contributions.” 10 In other words, this particular action was seen as a modest
step taken to
rebuild the fiscal strength of the City.
The City needs to ensure that it is delivering services in the most efficient
manner possible,
through continued diligence in attaining structural balance. In the coming
years, the City should
seek ways to optimize the provision of all services to citizens. The City
cannot
continue to
operate and provide services in the same manner as in the past, but must seek to
utilize current
resources in new, more effective ways, without the restoral of additional
positions. By further
evaluating the organizational structure and shifting the focus to core services,
the future
liabilities in the Retirement System and the City’s full actuarial contributions
will also decrease.
6. Pension Tax
top^
On July 1, 1978, Proposition 13 of the California Constitution took effect.
Proposition 13 limits
local agencies’ taxing power, but exempts from those limits a tax to pay back
indebtedness
approved by the voters before Proposition 13 took effect. Under current case
law, this exemption
includes a city’s pension obligation up to the level of benefits approved by the
voters before July
1, 1978. Section 76 of the San Diego City Charter further authorizes the City to
levy a tax “sufficient to meet the requirements of the SDCERS’ pension funds.”
On September 1, 1982 the
Office of the City Attorney issued Legal Opinion No. 82-3 on the Legality of the
Property Tax
Levy to Meet City Pension Plan Obligations. This letter opines that the City of
San Diego may
levy a tax in excess of the 1% limitation of Proposition 13 to meet the City’
obligation to fund
the Retirement System. Based on this analysis, the City Manager requested an
updated opinion
from the City Attorney on July 22, 2005. In addition, the City Manager may
request an actuarial
analysis for a possible pension tax for current system membership at the benefit
level that was in
place as of June 30, 1978, to estimate the amount that could be generated.
7. Transfer to CalPERS
top^
Although not expected to provide a financial gain to the City or its Retirement
System,
transferring the administration of the City’s Retirement and Disability programs
to an
independent agency merits analysis. The California Public Employees’ Retirement
System
(CalPERS) administers earned retirement, disability, death and health benefits
programs for
participating public employees, retirees and beneficiaries. CalPERS membership
consists of
employees of the State, non-teaching school employees, and the employees of over
1,200 public
agencies which are under contract with CalPERS. The public agency membership
basically
includes a safety category and a miscellaneous category. CalPERS is a defined
benefit plan.
Benefits are based on the member’s age, service and final compensation at
retirement.
The City is in the very preliminary stages of exploring CalPERS as
an option for administering
the City’s Retirement and Disability programs. The City has contacted CalPERS
representatives
and has begun gathering basic data. There are several legal and financial
questions that need to
be answered as the City considers this option. Those questions include:
(1) Can
the City join CalPERS without a vote of the public?
(2) Does the City Retirement System funding
ratio need
to be at a certain level prior to the transfer of the City’s program to CalPERS?
(3) Since
retirement is an individually vested right, is it up to each individual which
retirement system they
join?
These are just a few of the questions that need to be explored. City
representatives will
continue to work with CalPERS representatives as well as the City Attorney’s
Office to resolve
these questions. A legal opinion from the Office of the City Attorney was
requested on July 22,
2005 to address the legal considerations.
VI.
REVENUE ENHANCEMENTS
top^
As presented in the 2002 Blue Ribbon Committee Report on City of San Diego
Finances, and
more recently in a report by the Center on Policy Initiatives, the City of San
Diego has a
relatively low revenue base when compared to other major cities in California
and the nation.
The City of San Diego does not charge for residential trash collection, and has
never imposed a
utility user tax, as nearly every other major city in California has done.
Furthermore, the City of
San Diego has one of the lowest Transient Occupancy Tax (TOT) rates among the
ten largest
cities in California, and generally has one of the lowest business license tax
structures. In 1995
and 1996, the City even lowered business license fees in an effort to retain
existing businesses
and encourage business growth. As a low revenue base city, San Diego lacks
flexibility to
provide high level core services to citizens, as well as reduced flexibility to
address a long-term
pension deficit in just a few years.
In 1996, California voters limited the
ability to raise revenue with the passage of Proposition
218.
Based on Proposition 218, all new taxes or tax increases require voter approval.
New taxes that
are proposed to be used for general purposes (“General Taxes”) require a simple
majority vote,
or approval by 50% of the voters. New taxes that will be earmarked for specific
purposes
(“Special Taxes”) require a two-thirds voter approval. The voter approval
requirements set forth
by Proposition 218 would apply to all the potential revenue sources except the
trash collection
fee. Trash collection fee levy is not subject to voter requirement under
Proposition 218.
However, the People’s Ordinance under the City Charter requires that the City
provide free trash
collection to single-family residences; as such, in order to implement a trash
collection fee, it
would first require amendment to the People’s Ordinance with a majority vote of
the electorate
and after approval, a majority protest procedure (set by Proposition 218) is
required to
implement the fee. The table below summarizes the list of potential revenues
that, if voter
approved, could create significant revenue growth for the City of San Diego,
which could help
the City achieve structural balance and address the City’s priorities more
effectively.
(Table 9)
top^
The City Manager will work with the Council’s Revenue Committee to facilitate
further
discussion regarding revenue enhancement opportunities.
CONCLUSION
Restoring the funding level of the City’s Retirement System is a top priority
for the long-term
fiscal health and stability of San Diego. Thus, as part of the ongoing effort to
alleviate the unfunded liability to the Retirement System, the City Manager has identified
multiple potential
solutions. The goal is to increase the funded ratio of the Retirement System
through solutions
such as the use of employee contribution offset formerly paid by the City,
issuance of Pension
Obligation Bonds, sale of under-utilized City lands, securitization of general
revenues, and other
solutions that may be identified. City staff seeks City Council direction on
which of these
potential solutions are acceptable and should be analyzed in more detail.
Completely resolving the pension deficit is a long-term process and there is no
single solution.
Reaching that goal will require diligence by the City and a focused, dedicated
effort by the City
Council in adopting and implementing multiple solutions that will have
significant positive
impacts on the Retirement System. The City Manager will continue to identify and
propose long-term solutions via quarterly reports that will build upon the more
immediate efforts that are
implemented, maximizing the impact of our resources and creating long-term
stability in the
Retirement System.
Respectfully submitted,
_________________________ _________________________
Ronald H. Villa
Charles E. Mueller, Jr.
Financial Management Director Acting City Treasurer
_________________________
APPROVED: Lisa Irvine
Deputy City Manager
Attachments
Attachment “A”, Public Fund Survey
Attachment “B”, 2004 Wilshire Report on City and County Retirement Systems
Attachment “C”, Memorandum on Additional Steps to Reduce Pension Deficit
Attachment “D”, Memorandum on the Preliminary Analysis of Retirement
System Funding Options
Exhibits
top^
1 San Diego City Employees’
Retirement System Annual Actuarial Valuation report, Gabriel, Roeder, Smith &
Company, June 30, 2003.
2 San Diego City Employees’
Retirement System Annual Actuarial Valuation report, Gabriel, Roeder, Smith &
Company, June 30, 2004.
3 The EAN funding method
allocates the total value of a member’s expected benefit liability as a level
percent of payroll from the age of entry until retirement.
4 The PUC funding method
allocates the total value of a member’s expected benefit liability by a
consistent formula for each valuation year.
5 “Audit of Actuarial Work
San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System,” Mercer Human Resource Consulting,
May 11, 2004.
6 “Audit of Actuarial Work
San Diego City Employees’ Retirement System,” Mercer Human Resource Consulting,
May 11, 2004.
7 “Reversal of Fortune: The
Rising Cost of Public Sector Pensions and Other Post-Employment Benefits,” Fitch
Ratings Special Report, September 18, 2003.
8 “Increased Borrowing by
Local Wisconsin Governments to Fund Pension Liabilities Not Expected to
Adversely Impact Credit Quality,” Moody’s Investors Service Special Comment,
February 2003.
9 Estimates assume leases
selected will be “blue chip” credit tenants, i.e. high performing leaseholds
with proven track records.
10 “Moody’s Downgrades City
of San Diego GO Bonds to A3 from A1; Lease Ratings Correspondingly Downgraded,”
Moody’s Investors Service Rating Update, August 2, 2005.
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Estimated
Current UAAL
Root Causes
of the UAAL
Audit of
Actuarial Work Report by Mercer Consulting
Actions to enhance
the funding ratio
The Gleason Settlement
Proposition G
Proposition H
Public Disclosure Ordinance
Citywide payment for retiree
health
Downsizing the organization
Unclassified employees paid more
Negotiated wage freezes
Manager's Pension solutions
working group
The report does not address the issue
of rolling back certain pension benefits
Actuarial projections
for this report
$218 million deferred investment
$40 million
Actuarial loss for service purchase
$151 million, attributable to the
Fiscal Year 2006 and 2007 salary freezes
Declining amortization
Rolling amortization
Mercer recomended changes
Audit Committee has “substantial questions as to the soundness
of current and
future actuarial valuations"
Projections to 2014
The Base Case
Declining Scenario projection
The Base Case Rolling
Scenario projection
A list of potential solutions
Solution
Declining Scenario
Solution
Rolling
Scenario
Due to projected
continued decline in
funded ratio and continued projected actuarial losses additional
pension solutions are
required
They want the ERAF
III windfall
Benefits may be vested
with each member therefore elimination not included
Retiree Health Care Solutions
not included
Starting 2006 entire health
benefits will be paid from City's General Fund
Other
similar cities have notably higher funded ratios
Goal should include a mix of
solutions (excluding rollbacks)
The rating agencies
expect it
Reduction of City
“pick-up"
$600 million "Savings" to the
City must be used to address the UAAL
Local 127 negotiated 1.9% salary reduction
will "revert" to CERS in 2008
The labor
unions have forced the City to fund the Retirement System
The City must honor
the contractual agreement with the unions by fixing the pension’s funded
ratio
Unions contributions must not be available for the City’s
operations
The unions want to
ensure that the above terms are ratified by Council action
The case for borrowing
Leveraging available revenues
They have found a way around Charter Sec. 77
Potential pension
contribution sources
Issuance of revenue bonds against
"receivables"
Securitization options identified
Cable television franchises
Goal of $100 million from
property by securitization
Securitization of Long-term ground leases
The combined Franchise Fee and
Tobacco Settlement Revenues not enough to satisfy the employee offset
savings equaling $17.3 million
This $17.3 million must be used
"to support a leveraged mechanism"
Wage and benefit freeze
estimated $151 million positive impact on the pension liability
Properties held for investment as
against City's "core mission"
Staff seem to prefer keeping investment land
The interest on
POBs would be lower than the actuarial
cost of amortizing the UAAL
The City could issue POBs
on a private placement basis
Is B of A's tax
anticipation notes a private placement?
POBs
represent a true
commitment
POBs are bad during a
downturn in investment performance
POBs still need either
increased contributions or reduced benefits
A POB replaces an internal statutory
obligation the (UAAL) with an external debt
Reductions
in services and personnel
The City may
be able to levy a property tax for pre-1978 benfits
Retirement is an individually vested right?
The Center on Policy Initiatives
(the unions) says that SD has a relatively low revenue base
Proposition 218
require all new taxes or tax increases to have voter approval |